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Abstract
In this paper we propose a circle of care (COC) ontology that speciﬁes concepts and relations necessary to capture a patient’s
circle of care and allows one to make inferences about who is in a patient’s circle of care. The ontology can improve current access
control systems in making decisions regarding access events in real time and help identify past cases of illegitimate access through
the access log. We validate the ontology by augmenting the Fast Healthcare Interoperability Resources (FHIR) data model with
our COC ontology and presenting an example of access logs from FHIR that is extended to answer circle of care queries.
c© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
Peer-review under responsibility of the Program Chairs.
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1. Introduction
Protection of patient privacy is a major concern for hospitals and patients1,2. Role based access control (RBAC)3
is the de facto access control system that is commonly used by database administrators to grant access privilege to the
staﬀ of an organization based on the roles the users play in the organization. While RBAC provides a ﬂexible way of
access privilege assignment it lacks the necessary features required to capture the aspects of access control speciﬁc
to the healthcare setting. Patient-centric access control is an access control mechanism speciﬁcally designed for the
healthcare setting4, where in addition to user roles, permissions for each individual health record can be granted by
the patient. But even a patient-centric access control system by itself is not suﬃcient to capture subtle nuances of
access to a patient’s record when care teams are formed on-the-ﬂy and access to records is allowed for members of the
team who may not have the patient’s direct consent (explicit consent), but are allowed access due to their role being
in the patient’s circle of care (implicit consent).
Due to the complexity described above we are witnessing breaches of patient privacy caused by the individuals
whose roles allow them to access a patient’s health record yet they are not in the patient’s circle of care. For example
recently Island Health in Vancouver, Canada ﬁred an employee for looking at health records "to satisfy their curiosity
about patients for whom the employee had no care relationship"5. This is an example of an electronic health record
(EHR) system that lacks adequate measures to determine whether a healthcare practitioner or staﬀ has a care relation-
ship with the patient. To address this problem, policy makers introduced the concept of a patient’s circle of care as
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Fig. 1: Motivating Scenario
the network of all healthcare practitioners who are currently providing care to the patient6,7. According to this guide-
line access to patient’s health data should be only provided to those who either have explicit consent (the patient has
explicitly granted access permission to a person) or have implied consent (a consent inferred from a person’s actions
and the facts and circumstances of a particular situation). However, a lack of technological support to identify who
and under what circumstances are allowed implied consent made enforcement of circle of care policies or detection
of its violations diﬃcult in practice as we witnessed in the Island Health case5.
The objective of this paper is to semantically deﬁne the concept of circle of care which can support answering
simple queries of who in a speciﬁc point in time has a care relationship with the patient and thus is allowed to access
the patient’s record. The emphasis is on the following issues: (1) Specifying the aspect of a care event that needs to be
encoded in order to capture the concept of circle of care, (2) performing automated reasoning such that with minimal
impact on EHR systems allows simple circle of care queries to be answered, and (3) integrating this knowledge with
the EHR’s access control mechanisms. The representation of circle of care should be generic and reusable, such
that it can be used in diﬀerent EHR implementations. We built our COC: Circle of Care Ontology using RDF8
with the limited reasoning support of RDFS9. RDF is a highly ﬂexible data model recommended for the knowledge
representation of the web. While the RDFS’ expressive power is limited we will show in this paper that the basic
circle of care queries can be answered using the transitive closure of class hierarchies in RDFS.
1.1. Motivating Scenario
To motivate the need for an ontology for the circle of care we illustrate a usage scenario adapted (as shown in Fig.
1) from "... David Mann falls and is transferred to the hospital by ambulance with a suspected hip fracture. The next
day David’s former spouse, a nurse in the labour and delivery unit of the hospital, is advised by their son that David
was admitted. The nurse looks at David’s electronic health record to determine the reason for admission..."
In this scenario, even though David’s former spouse is a practitioner in the hospital and may have the permissions
required by traditional access control systems to access health records, her access to David’s record was not legitimate
as she has no care relationship with him. The concept of circle of care also deals with the temporal aspects of the care
events that classical access control systems cannot capture. In this scenario Mark the surgeon is authorized to access
David’s record for the speciﬁc care plan deﬁned in the speciﬁc point in time. However he should not be allowed access
the record in the future when Mark is in the hospital for other care plans.
The paper’s contribution and structure is as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the important concepts and
relations in our ontology. In Section 3 we explain how we will integrate our concepts into an existing EHR framework
(FHIR) and how we can populate our ontology with data from FHIR and use it to answer our queries. Section 4
describes the related research. We conclude in Section 5.
2. COC: Circle of Care Ontology
We adapt the ontology design methodology outlined in Uschold and Gruninger10. First we deﬁne the purpose of
our ontology. The purpose is the speciﬁc problem we are aiming to solve, which is identifying individuals, including
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Fig. 2: Conceptual Model of the Circle of Care Ontology
clinicians and staﬀ, who are in a patient’s circle of care. Second we scope the ontology. We deﬁne the scope of our
ontology as all information relevant in making a decision on a patient’s circle of care. We determine what information
is relevant by asking what questions our ontology should be able to answer. These questions are called competency
questions10 and if some information is required in answering these questions then the information is within the scope
of the ontology. If our ontology can answer these competency questions then we will be able to determine that our
ontology is valid. Examples of our competency questions are: Is a speciﬁc healthcare practitioner part of a patient’s
circle of care? Does a healthcare practitioner have implied consent to use a patient’s health records? Third is
identifying necessary concepts and relations that our ontology should be able to encode. The concepts and relations
are related to our domain of interest and scoped with the competency questions (described in Section 2.1). Forth
since our ontology will not be used in isolation we investigate how the ontology can be integrated with the encoded
knowledge in the hospital electronic health record system and its access control mechanism. Instead of dealing with
a proprietary EHR system, we decided to investigate how the ontology can be integrated with the Fast Healthcare
Interoperability Resources11 (FHIR) which is a new standard for interoperability between EHRs. Any organization
or EHR system that supports FHIR would then be able to extend its EHR to adopt our ontology. FHIR11 is being
proposed by HL7. If FHIR sees the same adoption rate as the HL7 v2 and v3 frameworks then the COC ontology will
be compatible with a large number of EHR systems.
2.1. The COC Ontology Concepts
Instead of designing the COC ontology from scratch we use existing concepts from the FHIR security event re-
source which outlines the healthcare practitioners who are using a patient’s data and what roles they play11 according
to the RBAC12 system. We only introduce new concepts when the concepts from FHIR and RBAC cannot suﬃciently
capture the concept of circle of care. The UML class diagram in Fig. 2 shows an overview of the COC ontology. In
this diagram all concepts and relations without an explicit namespace are borrowed from FHIR. The concepts and
relations with the "coc" namespace are added to enrich FHIR data model to capture the concept of circle of care.
Concepts and relations are deﬁned in bold, and are underlined when referenced.
Player: (captured by FHIR) Any entity that can interact with patient records. Players generally refer to an
individual but can include other entities. Examples of Players includes users, physicians, organizations, and
hospitals. All Players have a unique identiﬁer which comes from the EHR which is used to identify the Player.
Role: (partially captured by FHIR and RBAC) A Role may indicate the job of a Player or the kinds of actions
the Player is expected to perform. It may give indications as to the permissions the Player with the role may
have. In our ontology we only care about the Roles a Player has in relation to what duties the participant fulﬁlls
as part of an event. Roles are deﬁned through a role hierarchy, with some Roles being inferred from other Roles
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and relations the participant may have. For example the Role of Health Information Custodian as deﬁned by
PHIPA is inferred based on the Roles a Player plays as part of an event13.
Patient: (captured by FHIR) A subclass of Player, a Patient is any Player that can give permission to other
Players to access some Patient Records6. In our ontology, consent is given exclusively by the patients them-
selves but can be easily extended to include substitute decision-makers.
Practitioner: (captured by FHIR) A subclass of Player, a Practitioner is any Player that provides, or can
provide healthcare to some Patient. Practitioners may require access to some Patient Records6, and can be a
part of Care Plans.
Agent Relation: (partially captured by FHIR) An Agent Relation indicates a relationship between Players
where one Player does work on behalf of the other, as well as capturing the temporal aspects of these relation-
ships. For example relationships such as employer/employee are captured using Agent Relations.
Health Record: (captured by FHIR) Resources stored by the EHR which Players interact with. Health Records
generally refer to sensitive patient information for which access must be strictly controlled. For example clinical
documents, observation reports, and patient contact and billing information. Interactions in this case being
accessing, editing, disclosing or generating the resource.
Event: (captured by FHIR) The records of the interactions Players had with Health Records. Events fall into one
of four predeﬁned categories: lookup, edit, disclosure and collection Events. For example a physician accessing
his patient’s observation report would be a Lookup Event. Some Events including all Disclosure Events can
have more than one Player as in the case of one physician sharing patient information to a colleague in order to
get their advice.
Purpose: The reason a Player interact with a Health Record or for what reasons patients will allow access to
their Health Record. Can also be used to describe what the reasons for a Care Plan are. Purposes are deﬁned
through a purpose hierarchy where if a Player has permission to access a Health Record due to some Purpose,
the Player will also be able to access the Health Record due to all Purposes above it in the hierarchy.
Consent: (captured by FHIR) Given by a Consenter, to one or more Players for one or more Health Records
that are about the Patient. Consent indicates that the Patient has given permission for the Players to access or
use the related Health Records or has denied such access. Consent has a start and end time during which the
Consent is valid as well as what privileges (Example: read, write, disclosure etc.) are granted by the Consent.
Care Plan: (captured by FHIR) Created by health care practitioners and is used as a general strategy for the
provisioning of health care to the patient. Care Plans list all the Players who are part of the plan and what Roles
they fulﬁll as part of the plan.
Participant: (captured by FHIR) Represents the relationship between a Practitioner or Patient, and a Event or
Care Plan. It is used to indicate that the Player is part of an Event or Care Plan and also links to the Roles of the
Player as part of the Event or plan. Participant also has a boolean property that indicates whether the Player is
the instigator/creator of the Event or Care Plan.
We use rdfs:subClassOf in reasoning on role and purpose class hierarchies. There are generic top-level roles
and purposes, with both generally becoming more speciﬁc as we traverse down the hierarchy, and can be attributed
more speciﬁc permissions. In our ontology, roles and purpose have temporal properties with which we can reason
about their temporal validity. The implied consent can be inferred by identifying if an individual’s role at a speciﬁc
point in time is a health information custodian, and the purpose of access is providing healthcare.
3. Semantic Integration with FHIR
In this section we show how we can use the resource elements in FHIR along with the new concepts we proposed
for the COC Ontology for the semantic representation of access logs . We generate instances of access log events as
RDF triples (adopted from Samavi and Consens14). These log events not only captures the classical role based access
control knowledge but also information necessary for reasoning about a patient’s circle of care. We formulate circle
of care inquiries as SPARQL queries and run them against the RDF triple store. As a proof-of-concept we show how
we can use the ontology to encode an access log event for the scenario shown in Fig. 1 and run an SPARQL query to
investigate if Lucy is in the circle of care.
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7 <"http://www.coc.org/healthrecord/01325> a coc:HealthRecord;
8 coc:isInformationAbout <"http://www.cofc.org/consenter/david>.




13 <"http://www.cofc.org/role/nurse> a coc:Role.
(a) Access log event with COC ontology
1 SELECT ?participant ?patient WHERE {
2 {?event coc:used ?records .
3 ?event coc:hasPurpose ?purpose .
4 ?records coc:isInformationAbout ?patient .
5 ?consent coc:isConsentFor ?records .
6 ?consent coc:grantedTo ?participant .
7 ?participation coc:hasParticipant ?participant .
8 ?participation coc:usedRole ?role .
9 ?consent coc:hasConsentEndTime ?endTime .
10 ?consent coc:hasConsentStartTime ?startTime .
11 ?consent coc:hasConsentPrivilege ’read’^^xsd;literal.}
12 UNION
13 {...
14 ?carePlan coc:isPlanFor ?patient .
15 ?carePlan coc:forPurpose ?purpose .
16 ?participation coc:hasParticipant ?participant .
17 ?participation coc:partOf ?carePlan .}}
(b) An SPARQL query using COC ontology
Fig. 3: COC ontology in action
In FHIR the access log is stored as the FHIR SecurityEvent resource which keeps track of the Players (Lucy and
David) that are a part of the event using the associated FHIR Participant resource. The Participant resource is mapped
to the COC ontology (shown in Fig. 3.a) Participant class and links the Patient and Practitioner class to Participant
through the isConcerning property (line 2) and the hasParticipant (line 6 and 10) respectively. Note that we go through
a chain of two properties to go from an Event to the Patient or Practitioner associated with the Event. The role attribute
is also given by the Participant resource in FHIR and is captured by the usedRole relation (line 12), which links the
Participant instance to the Role class that encompasses the role given in the FHIR role attribute from the Participant
resource. Lucy’s role for this SecurityEvent is nurse, so it falls into the nurse Role class in our ontology. Purpose is
not covered by FHIR, but the FHIR data model can be extended by the COC ontology to include the Purpose class and
the hasPurpose property (line 3) which associates each speciﬁc SecurityEvent with a Purpose. By adding this concept
we can support reasoning about the circle of care query described below.
3.1. Circle of Care Query Evaluation
As a proof-of-concept we show how a patient’s circle of care query can be answered using SPARQL and RDFS
reasoning power. The query we are interested in is: Does healthcare practitioner Lucy have consent to access patient
David’s health records?
The formulated SPARQL query is shown in Fig.3.b. From our triples in Fig. 3.a we see that the access is captured
in a lookup event. Lucy performed the access with the role of a nurse and for the purpose of treatment. The query ﬁrst
checks to see if there exists explicit consent granted by David to Lucy for the part of David’s health record she is trying
to access (lines 2-11). Even though there is no explicit consent from David for Lucy to access his health records, Lucy
has implied consent because from our ontology we can reason that the role of nurse is a sub-role of health information
custodian and the purpose of treatment is a sub-purpose of healthcare. It is deﬁned in PHIPA that a health information
custodian may use implied consent to access a patient’s health records for the purposes of healthcare unless the patient
has explicitly withheld consent. Since there is no records of David having withheld consent to Lucy in our data, thus
Lucy can use implied consent to access David’s health records and is a part of his circle of care. The temporal aspect
of David’s care is captured through deﬁnition and querying of the care plan (lines 14-17).
4. Related Work
Access control mechanisms are generally used to regulate access to health data. Role-based access control systems
are commonly used in hospitals as the standard access control system for regulating access to hospital electronic
health records systems3. In traditional RBAC systems, the basic concepts required for decision-making are the roles
assigned to the user, the permissions that come with the roles and the role hierarchy3. Various extensions have been
added considering for location15,16, time16, as well as the context and semantics surrounding an access event17,18,19.
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Access to a data resource can be granted or denied based on the concepts listed above in addition to the roles a user
may have. Thus one of the main shortcomings of RBAC systems lies in capturing the consent of the patients. Patient-
centric access control has been proposed20 to address this problem. In patient-centric access control, the patients
themselves decide who can access their personal health information and are able to set speciﬁc permissions. This
approach introduces new challenges such as that patients may not be computer-savvy enough or have the necessary
knowledge to be able to set permissions which are able to adequately protect them20.
From the EHR perspective, FHIR11 is a proposed standard framework for developing the next generation of EHRs.
It is proposed by HL7 that is being actively developed and supported by a large and active community of developers
and researchers11. It is important to note that FHIR is not an EHR system in itself but instead proposes a framework
and set of resources that those who develop EHRs may use as a basis for their work. FHIR is the closest eﬀort
to capture many of the aspects of circle of care that we described in Section 2. However FHIR does lack certain
concepts such as purpose and the diﬀerentiation between explicit and implicit consent. Thus we propose in this paper
an integrated model that extends FHIR with our proposed COC ontology.
5. Conclusion
We have shown that it is possible to capture the semantics of a circle of care ontology that supports queries regarding
a patient’s circle of care, allowing detection of possible cases of illegitimate access to patient information both as they
occur and retroactively through the access log. Our proposed ontology provides SPARQL based solution for the circle
of care queries. Our ontology is designed to be easily integrated into FHIR supported EHRs. As well, the ontology
can be extended to include substitute decision-makers, which increases the complexity of the model but allows a
more accurate representation of who is granting consent. In the future we would create a full ontology that includes
substitute decision-makers and is deﬁned as part of the provenance data model proposed by W3C21.
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